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Volume 47 SPRING 1972 Number 3
THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION: AN
OVERVIEW
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLERt
Liberation means freedom. For a woman in American society-
today this means that she will no longer by virtue of her sex be placed
in a societally subordinate role, that she will have her choice of life
role, that she will no longer be channeled into a societally perceived
role of "wife and mother." While many women will choose the "wife
and mother" role, those women who do not must have the same oppor-
tunity to maximize their life chances as do men. By the same token, a
woman who does choose the "wife and mother" role must not for that
reason, be disadvantaged or made subordinate to her husband. Margaret
Mead put it very well when she said:
[S]ociety must also support fully women's right to remain
unmarried, their right to a personal life without children, to
a career alone or to a life of devotion to a small circle of
others....
* The climate of opinion is turning against the idea
that homemaking is the only form of feminine achievement.
But the pendulum must not swing too far, forcing out of the
home women whose major creative life is grounded in mother-
hood and wifehood. Finally, women can only be given real
opportunity by being offered real choices, each one under-
written by fair laws and fair practice and a social climate that
ensure that each life pattern will be considered a feasible and
dignified one.'
It is the right of a woman to choose her life role that, in my opinion,
constitutes the essence of women's liberation. When women are given
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Richard C. Rose, a third-
year student in the University of Kentucky College of Law.
t Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. Mead, Epilogue, in PRESmENT'S COMM 'N ON. THE STATUS OF WoMEN, AMERICAN
WomN 204 (M. Mead & F. Kaplan eds. 1965).
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that choice a consequence may be that men are no longer channeled
into the societally perceived role of "provider and patriarch," and in
this article there will be some discussion of discrimination against men.
However, the focus will be on the liberation of women and the relation-
ship of the law to that liberation.'
LAW AND EQUALITY
In speaking of sexual inequality, Pauli Murray has observed:
Sexual inequality is the oldest and most intransigent form
of discrimination in human culture; indeed it has provided
models for the subordination of other oppressed groups. As
in the case of racial bias, the individual's status is defined at
birth, and legal and social disabilities are imposed by virtue
of visible, permanent physical characteristics which identify
one's sex. For many purposes, law and social customs treat
all women as a separate class inferior to that of men.'
Whether one agrees fully with Kate Millett's analysis of the nature of
sexual politics," it is difficult to dispute her contention that our society
relates to women on the basis of their sex,' and that, "[the] entire cul-
ture supports masculine authority in all areas of life."' Stated simply,
"[t]he major political, social, economic and religious institutions are
firmly in the control of men."' This results from the initial channeling
2. In the past two years a great deal has been written on this subject, which
makes it possible to take the overview approach I have adopted here. The pioneer
work is L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANO-
WITZ]. Recent symposia on the law and women's rights include Symnposiumn: Women's
Rights, 23 HAST. L.J. 1 (1971); Symposium--Womet and the Law, 5 VALPARAISO
L. Rxv. 203 (1971). The equal rights amendment is treated in Equal Rights for
Wonen: A Symposium on the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARv. Civ.
RIGHTs-CIv. LI. L. REV. 215 (1971) ; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
3. Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview,
5 VALPARAISO L. Rxv. 237 (1971) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as Murray].
The article also points out that women are treated as a separate class inferior to
men, but that unlike a racial or ethnic minority, women are distributed throughout
the entire population and share class characteristics with men. A detailed analysis of
the relationship between sex and class is beyond the scope of the present article.
4. K. MiLLEIT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970) [hereinafter cited as MILLETr]. Millett
defines politics in terms of power relationships and analyzes sexual dominion from this
perspective. For a criticism of her approach, see Howe, The Middle-Class Mind of Kate
Millett, HARPERS Dec., 1970, at 110.
5. MILLETr, supra note 4, at 31.
6. Id. at 35.
7. Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VALPARAISO L. REv.
203, 207 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Freemani.
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of women into the "wife and mother" role, from further channeling
with regard to education and employment and from rank discrimination
in all areas of life in which societal power is exercised. No useful pur-
pose would be served here by repeating the now familiar and dreary
figures showing the extent of employment and educational disparities!
Nor is it necessary to set out again in detail all the facets of sexual
discrimination9 or to consider the effect that such discrimination has upon
the personality of women.'" It is clear that women are the "second
sex,"' that they are restricted in their choice of life role and that
sexual inequality is a dominant feature of American society today.
Since law theoretically reflects societal values,'" it is not surprising
that American law has never reflected the value of sexual equality."3 To
the contrary, sex-based distinctions in law are pervasive and to a large
extent serve to implement the societal determination that a woman's
primary role is that of "wife and mother." As the Supreme Court said
many years ago:
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator. And the rules of the civil society must be
adapted to the general constitution of things .... "'
While we have come a long way from the time when women were put
in the same category with children and incompetents 5 and when a
married woman's property, and to some extent even her person, were
considered legally subject to her husband's control, 6 it has still been
assumed that women as a class may be dealt with on the basis of their
sex, and that this sex-based distinction justifies placing women in a
societally subordinate role. As the Supreme Court said only a decade
8. See generally Murray, supra note 3.
9. For an interesting analysis of sex discrimination in litgation, see Nagel &
Weitzman, Woment as Litigants, 23 HAST. L.J. 171 (1971).
10. See generally Cavanaugh, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Legal Stereo-
types and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. La. L. REv. 260 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Cavanaugh].
11. S. DE BEAuvoIR, THE SECOND SEx (Bantam ed. 1970).
12. There is sometimes a distinction between a society's officially approved values,
as reflected in the law, and its operational ones. This appears most clearly in the
area of racial equality.
13. For an historical analysis see Freeman, supra note 7, at 208-25; Eastwood,
The Double Standard of Justice: Womenz's Rights Under the Constitution, 5
VALPRAI so L. RiEv. 281, 284-98 (1971) ; KANOrrwTz, supra note 2, at 151-54.
14. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872).
15. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 7.1 (1968).
16. This was reflected by the defense of coverture, discussed in KANowiTz, supra
note 2, at 88-92.
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ago, "[W]oman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life."17 Because the law has so regarded her, it operates in many ways to
force the woman into that role and to limit her ability to choose any
other.
In this respect, the law stands as an impediment to social change,
reinforcing the societal determination that woman is subordinate to
man and that her primary role is that of "wife and mother." The very
pervasiveness of sex-based distinctions, as well as their content (not
to mention the fact that they are made by male legislators and judges) 8
bespeaks the value of male supremacy. As Brown v. Board of Educ-
tion'9 recognized, racial segregation is not a process of mutual exclusion
-there is a segregator and a segregatee. The purpose of racial segre-
gation was to promote the doctrine of white supremacy.2" So too, sex-
based distinctions in law set off the "inferior" woman from the "superior"
man and, therefore, are used to justify discrimination against the female.
As Leo Kanowitz has so aptly observed:
As long as organized legal systems, at once the most
repected and most feared of social institutions, continue to dif-
ferentiate sharply, in treatment or in words, between men and
women on the basis of irrelevant and artificially created distinc-
tions, the likelihood of men and women coming to regard one
another primarily as fellow human beings and only secondarily
as representatives of another sex will continue to be remote.21
Until men and women see each other in this light, women will con-
tinue to be discriminated against on the basis of their sex.
On the other hand, as we have seen in the racial area, the law
can declare equality to be an officially approved societal value, and
its process can then be used in in the struggle to make that value a reality.
The law can operate as an instrument of social change both by imposing
sanctions against discrimination and by attempting to alter institu-
tional and individual behavior to conform to the value of equality.
Therefore, women must seek from the law a complete turnabout. The
law must be restructured to remove from it those sexual biases and
sex-based distinctions that retard equality, and at the same time it
17. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
18. For an illuminating analysis of judicial attitudes toward women as reflected
in reported decisions, see Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study
in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Johnston].
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
21. KANOWiTZ, supra note 2, at 4.
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must be affirmatively used to promote equality in all areas of American
life. This does not mean, of course, that changes in the legal structure
will radically change cultural norms or societal behavior patterns.
Declaring sexual equality to be an officially approved societal value
will not mean that overnight-or even in the foreseeable future-it will
become an operational one. Here again, we see an analogy to the
struggle for racial equality. At the same time that the Supreme Court
was declaring racial equality to be an officially approved societal value
and stating that racial distinctions were "odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon doctrines of equality,"22 the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was observing that America
consisted of "two societies, separate and unequal."2 Indeed, it cannot
be denied that despite all the Supreme Court decisions, civil rights
legislation and "affirmative action" programs, a vicious racism still
permeates most areas of American life.
But from the standpoint of the law and its relation to the struggle
for equality, this is beside the point. Legal change alone cannot bring about
social change. However, by making racial equality an officially approved
value we have removed legal roadblocks and have created a framework
within which social change can eventually take place. More importantly,
the processes of the law can be used as a weapon-in conjunction with
other weapons-in the struggle for racial equality. Likewise, if sexual
equality is declared to be an officially approved societal value, the law
will not, as it does now, perpetuate the subordinate position of women
but to the contrary can be used affirmatively to help accelerate social
change. No more can be asked of it.
This is the real significance of the proposed equal rights amend-
ment." It would represent a societal commitment to the value of sexual
equality. As has been observed, "[a] profound national commitment
to terminate sexual discrimination would provide a powerful impetus
for legislative efforts, as well as for individual re-examination of behavior
patterns that result in sexual bias."2
It would be possible, of course, for the Supreme Court, in its
22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
23. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CommISSION ON CIVIL DIsORDERS 1
(Bantam ed. 1967).
24. As to the history of the equal rights amendment, see Brown, sapra note 2,
at 886-88. The principal congressional opposition was in the Senate. It was finally
approved and sent to the states for ratification on Mar. 22, 1972. U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 835 (Supp. No. 3, 1972).
25. Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HAR.
Crv. RIGHTS-CIv. Lm. L. REV. 216, 220 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dorsen].
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"awesome Marshallian function as an occasional national policy maker,"2
to declare sexual equality an officially approved societal value by inter-
preting the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
prohibit all discrimination on the basis of sex. It could say that: "Sexual
distinctions, like racial distinctions, are odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon doctrines of equality. In every respect the
law must consider the woman to be the equal of the man." If the Supreme
Court would take this position, an equal rights amendment might indeed
be unnecessary.27 But it has not yet done so. In the recent case of Reed
v. Reed, 8 it finally held that sexual discrimination was within the equal
protection clause but limited that holding to discrimination that was
"arbitrary." Until the "inherently invidious" rationale is forthrightly
applied to sex-based distinctions and until sexual discrimination is con-
deemned in the same manner as racial discrimination, it cannot be
said that sexual equality is an officially approved societal value. From this
standpoint an equal rights amendment is still necessary.
I must confess that I find the opposition to the adoption of an
equal rights amendment on the part of purported proponents of sexual
equality 9 somewhat perplexing. Apart from arguing that the adoption of
an equal rights amendment will wipe out desirable social legislation ap-
plicable only to women-a result which can easily be avoided, as I
will disscuss subsequently-it is difficult to comprehend any valid objec-
tion to a constitutional amendment that would finally proclaim that there
shall be sexual equality before the law. The basic objections have been
summarized as follows: "Given the complexity of the problem, the
amendment will act in unpredictable ways, cause confusion and foster
excessive litigation." But to say that the problem is "complex" is a
value judgment that sex-based distinctions must continue to be made.
There is nothing complex about saying that the law presently distin-
guishes between men and women in a variety of contexts, most of
which serve to perpetuate the societally subordinate role of women,
and that these distinctions must be eliminated. As for the amendment's
"acting in unpredictable ways" and "causing confusion," I would ask,
26. Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387,
428 (1967).
27. See KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 192-96. Prof. Kanowitz now favors the
adoption of the amendment.
28. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 H~Av.
Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 234 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Freund]; Kurland,
The Equal Rights Amendments Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 243 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kurland].
30. Dorsen, supra note 25, at 223.
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"unpredictable and confusing to whom?" If the objective is full equality
and the amendment is broadly interpreted to implement that objective
in all respects, the results will be fairly predictable: sex-based distinctions
and discrimination against women, overt and subtle, will be invalidated.
As for "excessive litigation," I cannot perceive of litigation as being
((excessive" so long as the underlying problem remains.
It is also argued that legislation and judicial decision will solve
the problem," and that even with a constitutional amendment, legis-
lation and litigation on a case-by-case basis will still be necessary. This
argument totally ignores the manner in which the legal process must
be used to bring about social change. In terms of influencing the behavior
of legislators and judges-of manipulating the system, so to speak 2-it
it desirable to have on one's side a constitutional amendment that
proclaims sexual equality to be an officially approved societal value.
Where male judges and legislators are being asked to act counter to
ingrained notions of male supremacy,3" it may take an explicit constitu-
tional provision to convince them that this is what "the law" requires.
It cannot be doubted that the existence of the equal rights amendment
will make it easier to obtain favorable legislation and judicial decisions,
and for a lawyer this should be sufficient reason to advocate its adoption.
In this analysis of the legal dimensions of women's liberation I
will, as appropriate, deal with both the removal of present barriers to
equality and affirmative action designed to promote such equality. As
will be demonstrated, these objectives are interrelated. I see four aspects
to the legal dimensions of women's liberation, which may serve to outline
a functional basis for liberation as well. They relate to (1) a woman's
control of her own body; (2) equality in the marriage relationship;
(3) equality of employment opportunity and (4) treatment in all re-
spects as an individual rather than on the basis of her sex.
A WoMAN's CONTROL OF HER OWN BODY
The woman must be liberated from the burden of unwanted preg-
nancy. The basic biological difference between men and women-the
capacity of a woman's body to produce children-disadvantages a woman
in her choice of life role. This disadvantage is aggravated by the fact that
in this society, as in practically all others, the child care responsibility is
31. See generally Freund, supra note 29; Kurland, supra note 29. See also Mink
Federal Legislation to End Discrimination Against Women, 5 VALPARAiso L. REv.
397 (1971).
32. For a discussion of "manipulating the system," in the context of protecting
first amendment rights, see Sedler, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 1070, 1083-86 (1971).
33. As to those attitudes, see Johnston, supra note 18, at 741-46.
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assigned to the mother rather than to the father ;4 and here, though not in
many other societies, alternative means of child care, such as the extended
family system or public child care facilities, are the exception rather
than the norm. A woman to be in all respects equal to a man must, as
an initial proposition, have full control over her own body precisely
because that body is capable of producing children. Thus, antiabortion
laws or laws that limit the availability of any contraceptive measure 5
constitute an acute form of discrimination against women.
From the perspective of a woman, abortion must be viewed only
as the equivalent of contraception. Despite our advanced technology we
have not yet developed a contracptive that is fully safe, effective,
acceptable and available. Therefore, unless a woman opts for celibacy or
is incapable of having children, she must suffer the risk of unwanted
pregnancy due to contraceptive failure or unavailability. The very things
that make a wanted pregnancy a joy for a woman can make an unwanted
one a horror. Yet, in the great majority of our states abortion is pro-
hibited "unless necessary to preserve the life of the woman." 8 Ironically
these laws were originally passed to protect women from the dangers
of abortive surgery,"7 but have been retained long after abortion has
become a simple medical procedure." Only three states-New York,
Hawaii and Alaska-have fully repealed their antiabortion laws and
made abortion generally available on demand.89 Most of the so-called
34. Millett contends this responsibility tends to arrest the woman's development
at the level of biological experience. Millett, supra note 4, at 26.
35. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the constitutional right to
privacy was held to prohibit a state from barring the access of married persons to
contraceptive devices. Denying unmarried persons access to contraceptive devices
was held unconstitutional in Eissenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4302 (U.S. Mar. 21,
1972). Four justices took the position that the statute was unconstitutional. Two
other justices concurred on other grounds. Chief Justice Burger dissented on the
ground that the state could constitutionally limit the prescribing of contraceptives to
licensed physicians.
36. For an analysis of abortion laws prior to the most recent changes, see Lucas,
Laws of the United States, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD (R. Hall ed. 1970).
37. Most of the laws were passed at the turn of the century or shortly thereafter.
At that time the danger from infection and the absence of antibiotics made the insertion
of instruments into the uterine cavity a very dangerous procedure. For a general
historical analysis of antiabortion laws, see Means, The Law of New York Concerning
Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, z664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Con-
stitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
38. When effective antibiotics came into use, the danger from abortion was sub-
stantially eliminated. See Douglas, Toxic Effects of the Welch Bacillus in Postabortal
Infections, 56 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 3673 (1956). Today the mortality associated with
abortion performed in a hospital at an early stage of gestation is seven times lower
than that associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Tietze, Morality with Contraception
and Induced Abortion, 45 STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING 6 (1969).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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"abortion reform" legislation still falls wide of the mark. What is in-
volved is a woman's right to control of her own body; if she is to have
that right, it cannot depend upon a legislative determination that the
circumstances in which she seeks an abortion are "suitable."
In recent years antiabortion laws have been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds, and the decisions are most illuminating. The "Draconian"
laws, allowing abortion only "where necessary to preserve the life of the
woman" have been challenged on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth,
as well as on the "right of privacy" ground that a woman is entitled to
control over her own body. The vagueness and overbreadth decisions have
gone both ways,"0 with some courts fully upholding such laws on the
ground that the state can prohibit abortion in order to protect the "right
to life" of the unborn fetus."- In discussing the "right to life" argument
-which ignores the fact that this was not the purpose of the statutes
when enacted 42-- these courts seem to disregard the woman entirely. The
question is framed in terms of whether the fetus has a "right to life,"
and when the court finds that such a "right" exists, it upholds the statute
as a proper exercise of governmental power. Totally disregarded is the
fact that the fetus can "live" and develop only at the expense of the now-
living woman. Implicit in such reasoning is the assumption that because
she is a woman and "got pregnant," the state can compel her to be an
unwilling incubator and to "give life" to the unborn fetus. As one court
observed, "those who dance must pay the piper,"" and if a woman "gets
pregnant," she must pay the price." To say that the unborn fetus is a
"person... in this context means that the woman is not, for she is denied
the very essence of personhood: control over her own body to prevent
an unwanted organism from growing within it."5
40. For cases invalidating such laws see Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D.
IIl. 1971); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), decision as to juris.
postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). In United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62 (1971), the Supreme Court interpreted the District of Columbia statute
prohibiting abortion "except where necessary for the preservation of the mother's life
or health" to include mental health and found that, as interpreted, the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague. No other issues were directly before the Court in that case.
41. See Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Rosen v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
42. See Steinberg y. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 750-51 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (dis-
senting opinion).
43. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 748 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
44. The court observed that the unwanted pregnancy was the quid pro quo for
having engaged in the sexual act and "gambling and losing." It did not appear what
price the man who engaged in the act would have to pay.
45. No right is held more sacred, nor is more carefully guarded . . .
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
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When faced with such statutes, other courts, by analogizing abortion
to contraception, have invalidated the statute on the ground that the state
cannot have an interest in protecting all fetal life, "no matter how defec-
tive or intensely unwanted by its future parents." The furthest that any
court has gone in recognizing a woman's right to control of her own body
is the decision in Doe v. Bolton, now on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.48 In Doe, the court invalidated in part Georgia's "abor-
tion reform" law, which required approval of abortions by a hospital
committee and which specified the grounds on which an abortion could
be performed.49 In invalidating the part of the statute specifying the ap-
propriate grounds, the court stated:
Like the decision to use contraceptive devices, the decision to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy is sheltered from state regula-
tion which seeks broadly to limit the reaons for which an abor-
tion may be legally obtained ...
Rather than regulating merely the quality of the decision
to have an abortion and the manner of its performance, the
Georgia statute also limits the number of reasons for which an
abortion may be sought. This the State may not do, because such
action unduly restricts a decision sheltered by the constitutional
right to privacy.5"
However, the court sustained the part of the statute requiring approval
by a hospital committee, saying that once conception took place, "[t]he
decision to abort its development cannot be considered a purely private
one.""' Thus, the court makes the decision to have an abortion depend
not upon the grounds established by the legislature, but upon the opinion
of a hospital committee. The woman is still effectively denied control
over her own body.2
person, free from all restraint or interference of others unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (emphasis added). Perhaps
the Court's use of "his" is indicative of more than traditional preference of the
masculine form.
46. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
47. 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
48. It was argued, together with Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970) on Dec. 13, 1971. 40 U.S.L.W. 3300.
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a) (1971). The grounds related to physical and
mental health, fetal deformity and sexual assault. Like most of the "abortion reform"
statutes it is based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Prelim. Official Draft 1962).
50. 319 F. Supp. at 1055-56.
51. Id. at 1055.
52. See also Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), where
the court upheld a similar statute's prescription of grounds. In the recent case of
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It is difficult to predict what the Supreme Court will do. Indeed, it
may dispose of the case without reaching the merits." The judicial be-
havior in these cases-as it appears from the opinions and from my own
observations in litigating one54-- persuades me that the notion that a
woman has the right to the control of her own body, while it may seem
elementary to advocates of women's liberation, is a difficult'one for male
judges and legislators to accept fully.5" I will not speculate on the reasons,
psychological and otherwise, for this reluctance; it is enough to recognize
that it exists. Unless the Supreme Court in its role as "occasional national
policymaker" holds that antiabortion laws are unconstitutional as viola-
tive of a woman's right to privacy, a long, difficult struggle remains
YWCA v. Kugler, 40 U.S.L.W. 2617 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 1972), invalidating a New
Jersey statute prohibiting the performing of an abortion "without lawful justification"
on vagueness and right to privacy grounds, the court went far in recognizing the
importance of a woman's right to control her own body and in discrediting the so-
called "right to life" argument. As paraphrased by the editors of Law Week, the
court stated:
Finally the contention that the state has a compelling interest in preserving
the life of the embryo or fetus invites "judicial resolution of philosophic,
and religious dimensions as to whether an embryo or fetus is a human being
from the moment of its conception." It is simply concluded that this great
conflict is "beyond the competence of judicial resolution." It is noteworthy
that the New Jersey legislature has not afforded the embryo or fetus the
rights of a living person. It has never abrogated the common law rule that
self-abortion prior to quickening is not a criminal offense. Until the recent
decision holding the death penalty unconstitutional in New Jersey a preg-
nant woman could be executed prior to quickening. A wrongful death action
for a still-born fetus is not maintainable in the state and a fetus must be
born alive to invoke the rights that have been statutorily created for its
benefit.
Id. at 2618-19. In another recent case, Poe v. Menghini, 40 U.S.L.W. 2665 (D. Kan.
Mar. 10, 1972), the court invalidated the provision of a Kansas "abortion reform'
statute that required the approval of three physicians, on the ground that, since the
approving physicians did not have to be specialists, the requirement did not advance
any legitimate state interest. Moreover, the statute, in-the court's view, sought "to
subordinate the attending physician's judgment to that of two other physicians without
any showing that it effectively advances a legitimate state interest." Id. at 2666.
Interestingly enough, the "grounds for abortion" provision was not challenged in that
case.
53. In both cases the question of jurisdiction was postponed, and in both cases
it is the plaintiffs who are appealing from the refusal of the three-judge court to
grant injunctive relief. The Supreme Court could hold that the refusal to grant in-
junctive relief is not reviewable on direct appeal or that the lower court properly
refused injunctive relief, and either way would avoid having to deal with the sub-
stantive questions.
54. Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971), reversed in part the
district court's dismissal and remanded the case for consideration before a three-judge
district court. The case is now pending in the Eastern District of Kentucky.
55. In oral argument in Crossen, I was asked the question, "Does a married
woman have the right to an abortion if her husband objects?" The notion that a
husband has a proprietary interest in his wife's body dies hard.
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ahead."
Because I consider a woman's right to control over her own body
basic to any concept of sexual equality, I have discussed it first. And yet,
as the above discussion indicates, it is far from clear that such a right will
ever be fully recognized. It has not even been suggested, for example,
that the equal rights amendment would invalidate antiabortion laws
as a form of discrimination against women. Until the risk of unwanted
pregnancy is eliminated, the woman will not be free from the biological
burden of her sex and, therefore, will not be fully equal to the male in
terms of her choice of life role.
EQUALITY WITHIN THE FAMILY
The second aspect of the legal dimensions of women's liberation
relates to the law of marriage and the family. This area of law must be
reformed to recognize that roles and responsibilities within the family
should depend upon individual choice rather than upon sex. I am not sure
that this question can be fully separated from the broader question of
sexual freedom and repression, alternative life styles and societal-versus-
individual responsibility for the care and support of children. But to the
extent that it can, and to the extent that the nuclear family represents the
basic societal means by which men and women join together legally, the
law must not, as it now does, perpetuate the dependency role of the woman
in the marriage relationship. That role is reflected all the way from laws
requiring her to take her husband's name" to those making her and the
children legally dependent upon the husband for support." This is also
the area where the disadvantages to men resulting from the dependency
role of women appear most clearly-as any divorced man making alimony
or child support payments will attest. At the same time it must be re-
cognized that, whether because of "past channeling" or "free choice,"
many women will opt for the "wife and mother" role, and if a woman does
so, she should not thereby be disadvantaged or forced into a perpetual
position of dependency.
56. As a practical matter, with the legalization of abortion in New York, anti-
abortion laws fall most heavily on poor women. It is also easier for a woman of means
to obtain a therapeutic abortion where this is permitted. See generally Charles &
Alexander, Abortions for Poor and Nonwhite Women: A Denial of Equal Protection?,
23 HAsT. L.J. 147 (1971).
57. In practically all states the women is required to take her husband's name.
KANoWrrz, supra note 2, at 42-46. See also Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23
HAST. L.J. 233 (1971).
58. See Slater v. Slater, 327 Mich. 569, 42 N.W.2d 742 (1950); Forman v.




The basic reform which would significantly advance this objective
would be to make all the income and property of married people com-
munity property, irrespective of who earned the income or acquired the
property. Under a community property system, each partner contributes
his or her efforts within the home or outside, or by a combination of both,
to the well-being of the marital enterprise. Each partner thereupon has
the right to share equally in the wealth acquired by their joint efforts. 9
While eight states have community property systems,"0 as they are now
constructed these systems generally serve to perpetuate male domination,
since the husband is the manager of the community. In effect, the work-
ing wife is at a greater disadvantage than she would be in a separate pro-
perty state, because she loses control of even her own earnings. 6 In
Texas and Washington, each spouse has sole management and control
over his or her separate earnings, although they continue to be com-
munity property.62 A better solution to insure full equality would be to
provide for joint management over all property, so that all decisions
would have to be mutual ones.
Under a true system of community property, in which the manage-
ment would be entrusted to the partners jointly, many of the dependency
problems which accompany the present legal structure of marriage could
be eliminated. The contribution of the woman, if she chooses to stay at
home and take care of the children, would legally be considered the
equivalent of the man's.6" Secondly, the community property system would
be more conducive to an arrangement by which both partners would share
the household and child care responsibilities equally or by which the wife
would be the sole "breadwinner." It would enable the parties to make
their own arrangements concerning the contribution of each to the marital
enterprise, would equalize those contributions and would eliminate any
notion of "head of the household." This approach would also render
unnecessary any equalization of responsibility for support of each other
and the children,6" since the responsibility for support would be placed
59. See W. DE FUNiAx & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
1-3 (2d ed. 1971).
60. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and
Washington.
61. See Brown, supra note 2, at 946-48. The authors note that the adoption of
the equal rights amendment would render invalid community property laws that favor
the husband.
62. Id. For a discussion of the operation of the community property system in
California, see Grant, How Much of a Partnership Is Marriage, 23 HAST. L.J. 249
(1971).
63. This would obviate the necessity of compensating a woman for housework,
as some advocates of equality have proposed.
64. In most states the wife is liable for the support of the husband only if he
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on the 'marital enterprise. Upon divorce the property would be divided
equally 65 and there would no longer be any question of alimony.66
Viewing marriage as a partnership in this manner should eliminate
other features of the present system, such as requiring the woman to take
the husband's name67 and domicile' or providing that upon divorce the
wife is presumptively entitled to the custody of the children 6 while the
husband is liable for their support."0 Each partner would be able to keep
his or her respective name, or if they were required to choose a common
name it would not necessarily be that of the husband.7' Whenever it might
be advantageous to acquire separate domiciles, neither party would be
precluded from doing so." In the event of divorce, if the parties could
not agree on custody and support arrangements, the court would make a
decision with reference to the circumstances of the particular persons
involved, not on the basis of predetermined sex roles. There would also
be no justification for providing different grounds for divorce on the
basis of sex" or different ages at which males and females could marry.
is incapacitated or indigent and for the support of the children only if the husband
fails to provide it. As to the effect of the equal rights amendment on liability for
support, see Brown, supra note 2, at 944-46.
65. The partnership notion, unlike the "reward" notion behind alimony, would
reject anything other than an equal division, regardless of "fault."
66. The equal rights amendment would not require that alimony be abolished
but that it be available without regard to sex. Brown, supra note 2, at 951-52.
67. It has been contended that the equal rights amendment would not permit
a legal requirement or even a legal presumption that a woman took her husband's
name at the time of the marriage. Id. at 940.
68. A married woman generally acquires her husband's domicile by operation
of law, and he has the power to choose the common domicile. In only four states
can she acquire a separate domicile for all purposes. Most states allow her to acquire
a separate domicile if she is living apart" for cause," and all states allow her to acquire
a domicile for divorce purposes. KANowlTz, stpra note 2, at 46-52. As to the effect
of the equal rights amendment on choice of domicile, see Brown, supra note 2, at 941-43.
69. The equal rights amendment would prohibit such sex-based presumptions. Id.
at 953.
70. This is merely the continuation of his duty of support while the marriage is
subsisting.
71. See Brown, supra 2, at 940-41. In Forbush v. Wallace, 40 U.S.L.W. 3428
(U.S. Mar 6, 1972), the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the unreported decision
of a three-judge court upholding the constitutionality of an unwritten regulation of
the Alabama Department of Public Safety which requires a married woman to use
her husband's surname in applying for a driver's license and an Alabama common law
rule requiring the wife to take her husband's name.
72. In contemporary society it is not unrealistic for married persons to live
in different states and still maintain a viable relationship. This appears most clearly when
they maintain separate homes on different sides of a state line which divides a func-
tional socioeconomic and mobility area.
73. As to sex-based distinctions in regard to grounds for divorce, see the dis-
cussion in KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 95-98. As to the interpretation of such laws
under the equal rights amendment, see Brown, supra note 2, at 950-51.
74. Such laws and their effect under the equal rights amendments are discussed
in id. at 938-39.
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The focus then would be on the marital enterprise, on the equality
of the parties within that enterprise, and on their right to assume respon-
sibilities for its well-being without regard to sex. Doubtless, in the fore-
seeable future-if for no other reason than past channeling-the man
would continue to be the "primary breadwinner" in most families. But
the law would allow alternative choices and insure that neither party
would be prejudiced because of the role that he or she"5 plays within that
enterprise. Affirmative legislation would be necessary to bring this about,
and it has been contended that Congress could enact such legislation
rather than leaving it up to each state."6 In any event, significant changes
in the present law of the family are necessary to insure equality in the
marriage relationship and to maximize the opportunity of each partner
for choice of life role.
EQUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
As pointed our previously, discrimination against women is rampant
at all levels and in all kinds of employment77 and extends to educational
and training opportunities as well." Because of initial channeling and
denial of access to specialized education and training, many women lack
the ability to perform anything other than "menial" or "service" jobs.
Yet even those women who have managed to obtain education and train-
ing are subject to outright discrimination and frequently have to work
outside of their field or at jobs for which they are overqualified." Indeed,
it has been demonstrated that sex bias in employment takes a greater
economic toll than racial bias."0 As Kate Millett has observed, "[i]n
modern capitalist countries women also function as a reserve labor force,
enlisted in times of war and expansion and discharged in times of peace
and recession."8 In a society where personal power is related to economic
75. The use of the phrase "he or she" is intended to avoid the use of the masculine
form as a reference to both men and women. But is there not something sexist about
putting "he" first? In the "he-she" context, it could be justified upon alphabetical
precedence, but this would not suffice in the "his-her" context.
76. This would be so at least to the extent that present law perpetuates dis-
crimination. See Freund, supra note 29, at 235.
77. See generally Murray, supra note 3. As to the operation of the income tax
upon working women, see Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of
Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 49 (1971).
78. Inequality is particularly acute in higher education. Murray, supra note 3.
at 247-58.
79. Id. at 268-70.
80. Id. at 238.
81. MiLLE-T, supra note 4, at 40. Millett also contends that in socialist countries
the female labor force is generally in the lower ranks despite a high incidence of
women in such professions as medicine.
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power,82 the economic situation of women must be substantially improved
if they are in any sense to become liberated.3
In this area we see an interesting legal paradox. When women began
to enter the labor force in the wake of the Industrial Revolution and
began to compete for jobs with men, it was soon recognized they needed
"protection."8 It was assumed that, since her proper role was that of
"wife and mother," a woman would work only until she could marry and
have children or in order to supplement family income.8 5 Therefore,
so-called "protective employment legislation" was enacted in a number
of states to channel women into "safe and ladylike" occupations and to
take account of their physical "weakness" so as to preserve them for the
"wife and mother" role. Thus we find laws placing limits on weights that
women could lift,88 restricting the number of hours they could work,"r
providing for rest periods and physical facilities for women88 and exclud-
ing them from jobs "detrimental to their health and morals," such as
mining or bartending.8" It should be pointed out that some of these laws
were genuinely beneficial, such as those requiring minimum wages or
premium pay for overtime.8
Although some state courts held these early laws to be unconsti-
tutional,9 others upheld them on the ground that they were necessary to
preserve women for the "wife and mother" role. As one court observed:
Surely an act which prevents the mothers of our race from being
tempted to endanger their life and health by exhaustive employ-
ment can be condemned by none save those who expect to profit
by it. . . . Adult females are a class as distinct as minors, separ-
ated by natural conditions from all other laborers, and are so
constituted as to be unable to endure physical exertion and ex-
82. See Cavanaugh, supra note 10, at 269-71.
83. While widows as a class may have a certain amount of wealth, they often
have little control over it because of restrictions imposed upon its use. Our concern,
of course, is with the personal freedom that employability and control over income
brings.
84. For a discussion of the early history of "protective" employment legislation,
see Freeman, supra note 7, at 213-15.
85. In some states the same legislation applied to women and child laborers.
86. The present laws are cited in Fuentes, Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus
on Title VII, 5 VALPARAISO L. REv. 374 (1971).
87. Id. at 383 n.53.
88. Id. at 383 nn.57 & 58.
89. Id. at 383 nn. 51 & 52.
90. Id. at 383 nn.55 & 56.
91. See, e.g., Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895).
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posure to the extent and degree that is not harmful to adult
males. 2
In Muller v. Oregon,93 the Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on
these laws at a time when it was invalidating similar protective legisla-
tion applicable to men. 4 In so doing, it reinforced the notion that women
may be dealt with as a class on the basis of their sex because of their
"weakness" and societal subordination to men. The Court stated:
History discloses the fact that woman has always been depen-
dent upon man. He established his control at the outset by
superior physical strength, and this control in various forms,
with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present ...
Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be
removed by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits
of life which will operate against a full assertion of those
rights. . . . Differentiated by these matters from the other sex,
she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation de-
signed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legis-
lation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained. 5
The practical effect of these laws has been to limit a woman's employment
opportunities in comparison with those of men, and it is difficult to
believe that this was not recognized at the time of their enactment.9"
Concerned women early realized that such laws would have this effect.
Indeed, a plank of the National Women's Party platform stated that:
"[W]omen shall no longer be barred from any occupation, but every
occupation open to men shall be open to women, and restrictions upon the
hours, conditions, and remuneration of labor shall apply alike to both
sexes."
97
The uneven operation of these laws compounds the discrimination.
As has been observed:
When states forbid women from tending bar, can anyone
seriously propose that women are being protected? If anyone is
being protected, it would appear to be male bartenders. Similar
92. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. 5 (1900).
93. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
94. See KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 152-54.
95. 208 U.S. at 421-22.
96. In 1879 the President of the International Cigarmakers Union stated: "We
cannot drive the females out of the trade, but we can restrict this daily quota of
labor through factory laws." Quoted in A. HENRY, THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT 129
(1923).
97. E. BA=ER, PRo'rEc'rv LABoR LEGISLATION 432 (1925).
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explanations suggest themselves regarding the prohibition of
night work by women. Women have not campaigned to obtain
this 'protection'-and for a very good reason. They in fact do
night work all the time. Nurses, telephone operators, airline
clerks and scrub women have not been protected from night
work. Weight laws also are of doubtful protection for women.
Only a few states apply weight limits to all jobs, and these are
set so low that, if literally applied, they would prohibit women
from doing any serious labor-including carrying an unborn
child ...
When the labor laws that apply only to women are
examined closely, it becomes clear that they do not provide a
coherent system of meaningful protection. Nor do they deal with
the real problem for women-exploitation by being funneled
into the lowest-paying jobs.
8
The end result of much of the so-called "protective" legislation has been
to legitimatize discriminatory employment practices against women,
thereby further locking them into their societally subordinate position.
While these laws have not generally been repealed, in more recent
years Congress and some state legislatures have moved in the direction
of equalizing employment opportunities, or more accurately, of reducing
the disparities under which women must compete for jobs and be
employed. The Equal Pay Act of 1963," 9 while perhaps enacted to assure
that women's wages would not undercut those of men,1 " at least re-
presented a commitment to equality once a woman is able to obtain a
"man's job." It has been argued that "equal pay was irrelevant without
equal job opportunity," because given a choice between men and women,
employers would only choose women if they could be hired for lower
wages.' Most of the litigation in this area has revolved around what
constitutes "substantially equal work," and on the whole the courts have
interpreted the Act realistically to protect women from this kind of dis-
crimination.'0°
Far more significant in its potential for eliminating employment
discrimination is title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1"' which
98. Dorsen, supra note 25, at 222-23.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
100. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 226-27.
101. Id. at 227.
102. See Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforce-
mnent of the Law for Women, 5 VALPARAISO L. REv. 326 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Berger].
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex except where sex is a "bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal occupa-
tion of that particular business or enterprise.""" It is questionable, how-
ever, whether the enactment of title VII was intended to represent a
real societal commitment to the concept of sexual equality in employ-
ment. Much of the legislative history indicates that the prohibition against
sex discrimination was introduced by opponents of title VII for the
purpose of killing it altogether.' But this does not matter. It is now the
declared policy of Congress-an officially approved societal value-
that there shall be no sex discrimination in employment, and the behavior
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the courts in sex
discrimination cases indicates that this policy has been taken very
seriously. In particular the Commission or the courts could have seized
on the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to authorize con-
tinuation of many sexually discriminatory employment practices, but they
have not done so. To the contrary, they have held that women cannot be
dealt with as a class on the basis of their sex, that traditional male-female
stereotypes and notions of "chivalry" (male superiority) cannot be used
to deny employment to any person, that a woman cannot be denied a job
on the ground that it is "strenuous" or "dangerous" and that suitability
for a particular job must be determined on the basis of individual quali-
ficiation rather than by sex.'
The leading case establishing these principle is Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"0 7 where the court held that sex could
not be a requirement for the position of telephone switchman. Although
the court talked in terms of "reasonable cause to believe . . . that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved,"'0 8 it went on to prohibit the use of stereo-
types in determining whether sex could be a bona fide occupational quali-
fication. It would no longer be permissible to assume that all women
would be unable to lift weights or do heavy work, and any woman who
expressed interest was to be given the chance. Nor could women be
"protected" from "strenuous" or "unromatic" jobs, for as the court
observed, "Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as
unduly Victorian and instead vests individual women with the power
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (1) (1970).
105. See KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 103-05.
106. On the importance of individual qualification in relation to the constitutional
right to "vork for a living," see Berger, supra note 102, at 350-52.
107. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).




to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks."1 9 As Weeks in-
dicates, the courts have clearly rejected the notion that a woman can be
denied a job she seeks merely because it is not a "woman's job." ' By
the same token, customer preference cannot be relied on to justify sex
discrimination; thus, males as well as females are entitled to be employed
as airline stewardesses. 1 ' Although the courts have not been explicit,
it seems clear that the bona fide occupational qualification exception will
be limited, as the EEOC has proposed, to "job situations that require
specific physical characteristics necessarily possessed by only one sex.""' 2
Thus, sex would be a bona fide occupational qualification only where the
job was representational or sexual in nature, such as an actor or actress,
a model, a topless/bottomless waitress or waiter or a restroom attendant.
Similarly, the courts have invalidated "sex-plus" criteria for employ-
ment; consisting of sex, plus a purportedly neutral factor that in effect
discriminated against women." 3 In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,"'
for example, the company refused to accept employment applications from
mothers with preschool children, contending that this was not discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex."1 The Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam
decision, held that it was discriminatory, since such a rule was not applic-
able to men with preschool children." 6 Likewise, an airline could not
require that stewardesses be unmarried where male flight attendants
and other employees were not required to be unmarried."' Discrimina-
109. 408 F.2d at 236.
110. The elimination of the notion of "men's jobs" and "women's jobs" is the
logical corollary of saying that job entitlement is a matter of individual qualification.
111. Diaz v. Pan American Airlines, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), eert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971).
112. The EEOC guidelines are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1970). They
were expressly followed in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
1971). See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
113. The term "sex-plus" was coined by Circuit Judge John R. Brown of the
Fifth Circuit, dissenting from the court's refusal to rehear en banc the decision of
its panel in Philips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 416
F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969). He observed that, "If 'sex-plus' stands, the Act is dead."
416 F.2d at 1260.
114. 400 U.S. 542 (1971), rev'g 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
115. It emphasized that between 75 and eighty per cent of its employees were
women.
116. However, the Court indicated that the existence of conflicting family
obligations, "if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for
a man," could arguably be a basis for a bona fide occupational qualification. 400 U.S.
at 544. It was this indication that prompted Justice Marshall's concurrence; he
argued that the exception should apply only to jobs of a purely representational
nature. Id .The case was remanded but subsequently dismissed by stipulation. It is
doubtful if the required showing could ever be made, given the manner in which the
courts are interpreting the exception.
117. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
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tion as a result of pregnancy would also constitute discrimination on the
basis of sex, since only women can become pregnant. Discharging a preg-
nant woman, married or unmarried or requiring her to take compulsory
maternity leave, has thus been held to be violative of title VII."' So too,
it would be discriminatory to deny a woman the opportunity to use sick
leave for pregnancy purposes, since a male would be entitled to sick leave
when he was recovering from a hernia or prostate operation.
Sex discrimination may also result from the invocation of pur-
portedly neutral requirements, not reasonably related to the job in ques-
tion, that in practice operate unevenly upon women. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.," 9 the Supreme Court held that educational and aptitude re-
quirements could not be applied where they had a substantially dispro-
portionate impact on blacks, unless the requirements could clearly be
shown to be job-related. 2 ' The same rationale should invalidate height
and weight requirements which cannot be related to business necessity,
where their effect is to exclude women.' A New York state court recently
held, for example, that a height requirement for baseball umpires could
not be applied to deny the position to a woman, since it was not job-
related and "operated inherently to discriminate against women."'
22
The point I would emphasize is that the "bona fide occupational
qualification" exception has not been relied on by the courts to perpetuate
sex-based employment distinctions. The courts have read title VII and
404 U.S. 991 (1971) ; Lansdale v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971).
It is, of course, clear that the enactment of title VII invalidated the widespread
practice of denying employment to a married woman unless she could show that she
was the sole support of her family, the so-called "breadwinner"x rule. See Jurinko v.
Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
118. Doe v. Oesteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan.
1971). In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School 1d., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va.
1971), a "pregnant schoolteacher" rule requiring the taking of a leave of absence at
the end of the fifth month of pregnancy was held to be a denial of equal protection
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). A contrary result was reached in LeFleur
v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
In Schattman v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 40 U.S.L.W. 2614 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 1972),
rev'g, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), the Fifth Circuit rejected a challenge
on equal protection grounds to a state agencys policy of terminating the employment
of pregnant employees two months before their expected delivery date. The court
took the position that the agency could not be expected to evaluate the condition of
each employee and that the maternity policy was rationally related to a permissible
state purpose.
119. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
120. Post-Griggs developments are discussed in Oldham, Questions of Exclusion
and Exception Under Title VII--"Sex-Plh&' and the BFOQ, 23 HAST. L. J. 55
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Oldham].
121. The EEOC has taken this position. Id. at 73.
122. New York State Div. of Human Rights v. New York-Pa. Professional
Baseball League, 36 App. Div. 2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971). See Oldham, supra
note 120, at 84-85.
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related state antidiscrimination laws... as establishing equality of employ-
ment opportunity as an officially approved value and have implemented
that value by striking down many forms of sex discrimination." 4 These
laws, 5 therefore, represent an important weapon for women in their
struggle for equality of employment opportunity.
This brings us back to the legal paradox reflected in the existence
both of "protective" employment legislation and prohibitions against
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. What is presented is not
merely a conflict between differing laws, but a conflicting societal judg-
ment-which appears most clearly when the laws are seen in their his-
torical context-as to the proper role of women in society. If the proper
role of the woman is that of "wife and mother," she needs "protective"
legislation to preserve her for that role; not by mere coincidence, she
must not be able to compete too successfully with men who must perform
the "breadwinner" role. On the other hand, if a woman is to have her
choice of life role, she is entitled to the same employment opportunities
as a man in all respects. Since "protective" legislation has operated to
limit her employment opportunities, it is inconsistent with the thrust of
antidiscrimination legislation.
The conflict between protective legislation and equal employment
opportunity has been litigated in the context of whether title VII or a
state antidiscrimination law preempts or supersedes protective legislation.
However, the conflict has also been raised in the context of whether the
adoption of the equal rights amendment would invalidate state protective
laws, and riders have been proposed that would prevent it from having
that effect.' 26 The problem, however, is more complex. Some protective
laws represent genuinely beneficial social welfare legislation, and working
women are understandably reluctant to give up this protection. At the
same time the existence of these laws has resulted in discrimination
against women because employers prefer to hire men who are not entitled
to such protection. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between
123. As of May, 1971, 29 states and the District of Columbia prohibited employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sex. WOmEN'S BUREAU, LAWS ON SEX DISCRImIXA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT 3-9 (1971).
124. For a discussion of significant EEOC decisions in this area, see Oldham,
supra note 120, at 81-84.
125. In appropriate cases the Equal Pay Act may also be used effectively. As
to the use of both the Equal Pay Act and title VII and their interrelationship, see
KANOWlrZ, supra note 2, at 132-43; Berger, supra note 102, at 371-72.
126. See Brown, .upra note 2, at 886-88. The "Hayden rider," adopted by the
Senate in 1950 and 1953, would have applied to all "rights, benefits, or exemptions
conferred by law upon persons of the female sex." 96 CONG. Rac. 870 (1950) ; 99
CONG. Rxc. 8974 (1953).
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different kinds of "protective" legislation and to insure that while such
legislation will not be used to justify discrimination, beneficial legisla-
tion will not be abrogated in the process." 7 This result can be accom-
plished by invalidating those laws that directly deny employment op-
portunities to women and by extending the other "protective" laws
to men.
These laws fall into three general categories: (1) laws excluding
women from certain jobs, such as mining or bartending; (2) laws re-
stricting women's employment under certain conditions, such as night
work and overtime prohibitions and weight-lifting limitations and (3)
laws providing benefits for women but not for men, such as minimum
wages or premium pay for overtime. 2 The exclusionary laws should
be invalidated in their entirety, since by their terms they discriminate
against women. In Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Association, Inc. v.
Hawthorne,2 ' the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a local ordinance
prohibiting female bartending was not "a necessary and reasonable
exercise of the police power"' 0 in light of modern conditions. Since the
decision rested on that ground, it was not necessary, for the court to
consider whether the ordinance was a denial of equal protection or in
conflict with title VII or the state's own antidiscrimination law.''
In Krauss v. Sacramento Inn,"2 however, a federal court held that
California's statutory prohibition against female bartending was not
pre-empted by title VII since the twenty-first amendment gave the
states plenary power to regulate the sale of liquor within their borders.
The plaintiff in that case did not challenge the prohibition as violative
of equal protection. Since, as the court reasoned, the states had plenary
control over the sale of liquor, title VII could not apply to the prohibi-
tion. Yet in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,'33 the California Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that the twenty-first amendment was not applicable
127. It is significant that some cases seeking to invalidate these protective
laws as in conflict with title VII have been initiated by employers. As to interpretation
of these laws by state agencies in light of title VII and related state laws, see the
discussion in Kennedy, Sex Discrimination: State Protective Laws Since Title VII, 47
NoTRE DAME LAW. 514 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
128. See Brown, supra note 2, at 922. Prior to the enactment of title VII, Indiana
repealed its hours restriction; after title VII, nine other states followed suit. Two of
these states repealed their "benefits for women" laws as well. Some other modifications
have also occurred. See Kennedy, supra note 127, at 525. See generally Barnhard,
The Conflict Between State Protective Legislation and Federal Laws Prohibiting Sex
Discrimination: Is It Resolved?, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 25 (1971).
129. 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970).
130. Id. at 186, 270 A.2d at 631.
131. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (1960).
132. 314 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
133. -Cal. 3d-, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
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to the employment of persons in liquor establishments and, therefore, the
statutory prohibition was preempted by title VII."s4 It was also held
that the prohibition constituted arbitrary discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 5
and of a state constitutional provision to the effect that a person may
not be disqualified because of sex from entering or pursuing a lawful
profession.'
The concept of female inferiority reflected in exclusionary employ-
ment laws is totally inconsistent with the premises of title VII, and under
the Weeks doctrine sex cannot be a bona fide occupational qualification
for a job such as bartending or mining. Preemption of such laws under
title VII is clear,3 7 and the unsoundness of the twenty-first amendment
argument advanced in Krauss is amply demonstrated by the decision in
Sail'er In. Moreover, the total exclusion of women from particular jobs
is the kind of arbitrary discrimination on the basis of sex that was con-
demned in Reed. Adoption of the equal rights amendment would cer-
tainly invalidate such laws, but, as the above discussion indicates,
they can also be invalidated under existing statutory and constitutional
provisions as presently interpreted.' So too, laws requiring compulsory
maternity leave without providing for job security or retention of
accrued benefits have the same effect as exclusionary laws and likewise
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.'39 The state is justified in
"protecting" pregnant women and new mothers only when continuation
of employment would jeopardize the well-being of the particular woman,
and it cannot provide that she loses her employment for these reasons while
a temporarily disabled male employee does not. 4 '
134. The court reasoned that the purpose of the twenty-first amendment was
merely to allow the states to retain prohibition, and that, in any event, title VII
did not interfere with the state's power to regulate the flow of alcohol as a commodity
in interstate commerce. Id. at -, 485 P.2d at 535-36, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
135. It treated sexual classifications as at least "marginally suspect" and could
find 'no compelling state interest in preventing females from tending bar. Id. at -,
485 P.2d at 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
136. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 18. See also McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970), holding that a municipal ordinance prohibiting employ-
ment of women as bartenders was in violation of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. In Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1968), the court held that
such a prohibition was impliedly repealed by the state's anti-discrimination law.
137. See Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
138. See Brown, supra note 2, at 928-29.
139. Id. at 929-32. The rationale is the same as that prohibiting employer discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy.
140. A proper approach would be to allow pregnant women and new mothers,
like any other temporarily disabled employees, to determine the duration and timing
of their leave. Id. at 932. But see Schattnan v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 40 U.S.L.W.
2614 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 1972).
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Laws providing benefits for women but not for men, such as
minimum wages or overtime for women, need not be invalidated but
can be extended to cover men as well. Thus, in Potlatch Forests, Inc.
v. Hays,'4' the court held that there was no conflict between a state
law requiring overtime pay for women and the provisions of title VII,
since the employer could comply with both by paying overtime rates to
men. Since these laws clearly appear to be intended to confer a benefit
upon women, and since many of them were originally enacted at a time
when it was assumed that similar legislation covering men would be
unconstitutional, it should be presumed that the legislatures would prefer
to have these laws remain in effect as extended. If the legislature wants
to remove the protection, it can do so subsequently. The equal rights
amendment should be construed in the same way with respect to its
effect on such laws.'42
The more difficult question concerns laws which restrict the con-
ditions of employment, such as those limiting the amount of weight a
woman can lift or prohibiting overtime work. It is clear in cases
covered by title VII that these laws cannot be relied upon by employers
to deny employment to women. 4 ' As the EEOC has stated, "[s] uch ....
laws . . . have ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the ex-
panding role of the female worker in our economy.""' The implication
is that such laws are abrogated by title VII, and presumably women
as well as men can be required to work overtime or to lift any amount
of weight.""
It is here that some further consideration is necessary. While
many women as well as men want to obtain overtime work, others do
not, and the removal of this restriction will mean that women workers
will be compelled, as men now are, to work overtime in order to keep
their jobs. 4' Similarly, while some of the weight-lifting restrictions
141. 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
142. See Brown, supra note 2, at 927-28. See also KANowITz, supra note 2, at
183-88.
143. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); LeBlanc
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971); Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Kober v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ; Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp.
391 (D. Mass. 1971); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore.
1969).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1970).
145. This is most evident where the plaintiff is an employer who, as a result of
the decision, is relieved of compliance with the state laws. See Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
146. As to abuses of overtime work by employers, see the discussion in KANowrrZ,
supra note 2, at 124-26.
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may be unreasonably low,147 others are not, and it is questionable
whether any employee should be required to lift unreasonable weights.
Other "protective" legislation, such as that requiring rest breaks or
comfort facilities can be of equal benefit to male employees. It is pre-
cisely the possibility of loss of these benefits that has been of great
concern to working women, and the desire to retain this kind of "pro-
tective" legislation cannot be viewed solely as a "sexist plot" to keep
women in a subordinate position. To the contrary, it illustrates the
matter of class differences in the struggle for equality which has emerged
in the debate over the equal rights amendment. As the Women's Libera-
tion Labor Committee of Los Angeles has contended, "Equal Rights
does not mean equal exploitation,"'4 8 and the Committee has proposed an
addition to the amendment which would provide that "Rights, bene-
fits or exemptions now conferred by law upon persons of the female sex
shall be extended to persons of the male sex."' 49
I would agree with this approach, although I am not sure that
the problem should be dealt with in exactly this manner. In order to
protect workers of both sexes from exploitation, laws restricting the
conditions of employment should generally be extended to men. I would
not include unreasonably low weight-lifting limitations and would deal
with the problem of overtime work by providing that no employee can
be required to work overtime against his or her wishes. 5 ' The main point
is that the desire for equality of employment opportunity should not
be used to abrogate genuinely beneficial legislation and allow for worker
exploitation.
The affirmative provisions of title VII and related state anti-
discrimination laws represent an important vehicle for achieving equal
employment opportunity for women. It should also be clear that sex
discrimination in employment on the part of governmental units and
public bodies, even if not covered by title VII or state laws,"5' is pro-
hibited by the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause in the
same manner as is racial discrimination. 5 ' Equality of employment
147. See Brown, supra note 2, at 934.
148. Women's Liberation Labor Comm. of Los Angeles, Statement on The Equal
Rights Amendment (mimeo).
149. Id.
150. See KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 126-27.
151. Title VII has recently been amended to include state and local governmental
units and educational institutions. Pub. L. No. 92-261 (Mar. 23, 1972).
152. See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va.
1971). In Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971), it was held that the
exemption of state and local governments under title VII did not bar an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Sex discrimination is proscribed by executive order
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opportunity has become an "officially approved" value, and the law's
sanctions may be used effectively to help bring it about. The behavior of
the courts in this area has clearly been on the side of equality, and a
momentum has been established by which the remaining aspects of
employment discrimination may, legally at least, be eliminated. This does
not mean, of course, that the concept of "male" and "female" jobs is
going to disappear overnight or that the cumulative effect of years
of channeling and outright discrimination will not seriously restrict
employment opportunities for a great number of women for some time.
But a start has been made, and women are now in a much better position,
with the law and its sanctions on their side, to obtain equality of employ-
ment opportunity.
LEGAL DISTINCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF SEX
Finally, all remaining sex-based distinctions in law must be
eliminated. A sex-based distinction in law may be defined as one that
makes a difference in treatment depend on the class or categorical basis
of sex,"' and, as stated at the outset, these distinctions are pervasive.
Not all of these legal distinctions are disadvantageous to women-
immunity from the draft is a clear example of one that is not-but
many are. Some on their face would appear to be trivial; others are
quite significant. But it is the existence of such distinctions, reinforced
by legal sanctions and justification, that serves to perpetuate the societally
subordinate role of women. As has been observed:
Our legal structure will continue to support and command
an inferior status for women so long as it permits any dif-
ferentiation in legal treatment on the basis of sex. This is
so for three distinct but related reasons. First, discrimination
is a necessary concomitant of any sex-based law because a large
number of women do not fit the female stereotype upon which
such laws are predicated. Second, all aspects of separate
treatment for women are inevitably interrelated; discrimina-
tion in one area creates discriminatory patterns in another.
Thus a woman who has been denied equal access to education
will be disadvantaged in employment even though she receives
with respect to federal employment, employment by federal contractors and sub-
contractors and on federally assisted construction projects. Exec. Order No. 11,478,
3 C.F.R. § 133 (1969), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, note (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,246,
as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 320 (1967), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
note (1970).
153. KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 4.
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equal treatment there. Third, whatever the motivation for
different treatment, the result is to create a dual system of
rights and responsibilities in which the rights of each group
are governed by a different set of values. History and ex-
perience have taught us that in such a dual system one group
is always dominant and the other subordinate. As long as
woman's place is defined as separate, a male-dominated society
will define her place as inferior."'
The basic premise of sexual equality, then, is that sex is not a permissible
factor in determining the legal rights of women or of men, and that the
treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon that person's
sex.1
55
When the proposition is stated in this way, two imaginary horribles
are usually posited: sexually integrated rest rooms and women's being
drafted into the armed forces. To allay these fears, it should be stated
that equality before the law does not mean that men and women will have
to perform their bodily functions within view of each other. If legal
"authority" is needed to support such an obvious point, it can be found
in the constitutional right to privacy.'56 With respect to the draft, there
is no reason why women should be deprived of the "supreme and noble
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the
nation,"'5 7 that is represented by involuntary conscription.' Whether or
not they have the "right" to perform combat service is perhaps another
matter, but it should be observed that the overwhelming majority of
male draftees do not perform combat service either. With the draft
supposedly coming to an end in 1973, the problem may be a minor one.
Finally, equality does not prohibit different treatment on the basis of
physical characteristics unique to one sex, 5 ' and, again to allay great
154. Brown, supra note 2, at 873-74 (emphasis in original).
155. Id. at 889-90.
156. Id. at 900-02.
157. The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
158. The courts have disagreed, at least when male draftees have resisted induc-
tion on the basis that they were being discriminated against on the basis of sex. See
United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969);
United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ; United states v. Clinton,
310 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). For the view that the equality principle requires that women be
subject to the draft, see Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to
Critics of the Equal Rights Amendment, 23 HAsT. L.J. 199 (1971). Women should in
any event be entitled to be admitted to military academies and schools, since they now
can serve in the armed forces on a voluntary basis.
159. See Brown, supra note 2, at 893-94.
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fears, it may be assumed that most athletic competition can continue to
be sexually segregated. 6 '
Having disposed of these so-called objections, it is submitted that
there can be no justification for sex-based distinctions in law except to
serve the notion of male supremacy.' 6' Sex-based distinctions, like racial
ones which are designed to maintain white supremacy, should be
declared "inherently invidious" and unsupportable except upon a show-
ing of compelling governmental justification, which, as a practical matter,
means not at all."0 2 The clear thrust of the equal rights amendment would
be to invalidate these distinctions. The same result, however, could be
reached if the interpretation suggested above were put upon the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. 3
In Reed, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to declare such
classifications invidious, but declined. The -case involved a challenge
to one of those "minor" sex-based distinctions, an Idaho law relating
to the administration of decedents' estates, which provided: "Of several
persons claiming and equally entitled to administer males must be pre-
ferred to females."' 64 As the petitioner pointed out in her brief to the
Supreme Court: "The statute and the justification offered for it by
the Idaho court assume, Orwellian fashion, this fundamental principle:
'All people are equal, but male people are more equal than female
people.' 'I' The Court held only that the equal protection clause pro-
hibited "arbitrary" distinctions on the basis of sex, thereby implying
that some distinctions might not be arbitrary. The distinction drawn by
the Idaho statute was arbitrary, in the view of the Court, since it was
based solely on sex and had nothing to do with the purpose of the
provision, which was to eliminate hearings on questions of who was
entitled to administer. The Court stated:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause
160. But women should not be barred from participation where competition is
on an individual basis, such as in horse racing or golf.
161. See Brown, supra note 2, at 890.
162. The only "invidious" racial classification that has ever been sustained was that
requiring the relocation of all Japanese-Americans during World War II. See Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
163. See KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 154-60.
164. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-312, -314 (1947). These statutes have been repealed,
effective July 1, 1972. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-312, -314 (1971 Supp.).
165. Brief for the Appellant at 69.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as
to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy,
the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely
on the basis of sex."'
The Court could have added that a clear alternative was available to
achieve the legislative objective, such as making the choice by lot rather
than by sexual classification, and that the failure to employ that alter-
native demonstrated the arbitrariness of the sex-based distinction.
While Reed approached sex-based distinctions in terms of "arbitrar-
iness" rather than treating them as "inherently invidious," the practical
effect of the decision-depending on how it is applied by the lower courts
and ultimately by the Supreme Court-may be substantially the same
as if the Court had come down fully on the side of sexual equality.'87
Whenever a sex-based distinction is purportedly related to the accom-
plishment of a legitimate governmental objective, as in Reed, it can
generally be demonstrated that a neutral nonsexual alternative classifica-
tion that would better accomplish the objective was readily available.
This being so, to mandate the choice solely on the basis of sex and to
deal with the problem in terms of sexual preference is clearly "'arbitrary."
To illustrate, in Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp.,'68 the Seventh
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of denying an action for loss of con-
sortium to a married woman on the ground that in such actions there
was the possibility of double recovery. According to the court, since
married men were employed at at rate two and one-half times that of
married women, the state could "justifiably discriminate in this respect
between the spouses," and "could infer that more often in a wife's suit
than in her husband's, the jury would award her duplicating damages
for some of the same elements of injury."'68 However, the objective of
of preventing double recovery could be easily achieved by requiring
joinder of the consortium claim with the spouse's claim for his or
166. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
167. In Forbush v. Wallace, 40 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1972), the Court
affirmed without opinion an unreported decision of a three-judge court upholding
a requirement that a woman use her married name on a driver's license. I do not
think that this action should be taken as indicating anything other than that the
Court did not want to deal with the question at this time.
168. 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968).
169. Id. at 850. The possibility of double recovery existed because the husband
could recover for lost earnings, and the loss of consortium claim purportedly could
overlap. Lower federal courts had held the Indiana rule involved violative of equal
protection and, therefore, had allowed the wife to maintain the action. Karczewski
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Owen v. Illinois Baking
Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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her personal injuries. Since a neutral, nonsexual alternative would ac-
complish this objective, according to Reed, "the choice in this context
may not lawfully be mandated on the basis of sex." Likewise, in
Leighton v. Goodman,' a male called for jury service challenged a
New York statute allowing women to claim exemption from jury service.
In upholding the statute, the court took the position that the distinction
was not arbitrary, since, "[g]ranted that some women pursue business
careers, the great majority constitute the heart of the home, where they
are busily engaged in the 24-hour day task of producing and rearing
children, providing a home for the entire family, and performing the daily
household work, all of which demands their full energies," and there-
fore, "[t]he state legislature has permitted the exemption in order not
to risk disruption of the basic family unit."'' However, since not all
women are "homemakers," and since some men may be, the legislature
could just as easily have provided for exemptions for persons having
child care and family responsibilities. The sex-based distinction includes
women who do not come within the legislative objective, and possibly
excludes some men who do, and for this reason is arbitrary. 2
The under- and overinclusiveness of such sex-based classifications
represent class judgments without regard to individual circumstances.
They are administratively unnecessary because a neutral classification
exists, and thus their over- and underinclusiveness cannot be justified as
an unavoidable consequence of rational classification to achieve a legiti-
mate legislative goal. Therefore, even if it is granted that no compelling
state interest is necessary because the classification is not "invidious," a
close connection between the legislative goal and the classification used is
necessary to foreclose attainment of the impermissible objective of making
distinctions solely on the basis of sex. To hold otherwise is to allow
deliberate and unnecessary stifling of personal liberties under the guise
of attaining a legitimate governmental purpose.
Even more arbitrary, and presumably condemned under the Reed
rationale, is differential treatment or denial of benefits solely on the
170. 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
171. Id. at 1183.
172. The matter of excluding all women from juries except for volunteers was
before the Supreme Court this term in Alexander v. Louisiana, 40 U.S.L.W. 4365
(U.S. Apr. 3, 1972), reV'g 255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891 (1970). However, the majority
of the Court did not reach the question, holding that the petitioner had made out a
prima facie case of racial discrimination, which was not rebutted. Mr. Justice Douglas
did reach the question in his concurrence and took the position that the practical ex-
clusion of women from the jury deprived the defendant of due process. In Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the Court had upheld such a system on the ground that
woman vas still "the center of home and family life." Id. at 62.
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basis of sex where no legitimate governmental objective is served by
making the distinction. The clearest examples are the exclusion of women
from juries""8 or the imposition of different sentences for a crime de-
pending upon the sex of the offender." 4 It is likewise arbitrary to dis-
criminate between the recipients of governmental benefits solely because
of their sex. For example, in Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.," 5 the
court was faced with a workmen's compensation statute that denied
recovery for the death to the husband of a working woman unless he
could show that he had been totally dependent upon her for support.
The wife of a working male was entitled to recover for his death with-
out qualification. Here the discrimination is purely on the basis of sex
without regard to individual circumstances and does not even plausibly
relate to the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental objective.
Either there should be an absolute right to recovery, or dependency
should be a requirement in all cases. The sex of the deceased worker
is logically irrelevant either way. In Duley, the court upheld the statute
simply on the ground that it was reasonable to distinguish on the basis of
sex. Clearly, this holding is inconsistent with the "arbitrariness"
rationale of Reed. Equally arbitrary is the allowance of social security
benefits to a wife or widow based on the husband's earnings without
regard to dependency, while a husband or widower is entitled to bene-
fits only if he proves that he received at least half of his support from
his wife."' Again, the distinction is based solely on sex, and men and
women as classes are treated differently without regard to individual
circumstances. It is no answer to say that more women are dependent
upon men than men are upon women. If dependency is the criterion, it
can be applied without regard to sex. If it is not, it is patently dis-
173. This was held unconstitutional in White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D.
Ala. 1966), but was upheld in State v. Hall, 197 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966), appeal dis-
inissed, 385 U.S. 98 (1956). All jury exclusion laws have now been repealed.
174. Disparate sentences imposed against women were invalidated in United States
ex tel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968), and Commonwealth v.
Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). In Reed v. Page, 40 U.S.L.W. 2631 (10th
Cir. Mar. 11, 1972), the court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that defined
"juveniles" for purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction as males under the age of sixteen
or females under the age of eighteen. It observed that it had "not been presented with
a logical constitutional justification for the discrimination." Id. However, in Wark v.
State, -Me.-, 266 A.2d 62 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 52 (1970), the court upheld
the imposition of heavier sentences upon males for the offense of prison break. See the
discussion of these cases in Johnston, supra note 18, at 726-31. For a discussion of the
effect of the equal rights amendment on sexual offenses and disparate sentencing, see
Brown, supra note 2, at 954-67.
175. 44 Ill. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969).
176. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE 11 (1970).
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criminatory to impose the requirement on one sex alone. Likewise,
denial of disability benefits for pregnancy and treating pregnancy dif-
ferently from other disabilities for purposes of unemployment compen-
sation, job eligibility and the like constitute arbitrary discrimination
on the basis of sex, since a disability unique to women is singled out
from other disabilities. 77
Although the Supreme Court did not fully invalidate all sex-based
distinctions in Reed, the "arbitrary distinction on the basis of sex" test
that the Court formulated in that case can be employed effectively, in
my view, to eliminate much of the discrimination that now exists due
to sexual classification. It is patently arbitrary to classify solely on the
basis of sex where no legitimate governmental objective can be accom-
plished by the classification, and the effect is simply to treat women, and
in some cases, men, differently because of their sex. Where the purported
purpose of the distinction is the accomplishment of a legitimate govern-
mental objective, and that objective could be accomplished on the basis
of neutral, nonsexual criteria, the failure to use such criteria renders
the sex-based distinction arbitrary. Whether the lower courts and
ultimately the Supreme Court will interpret Reed in this manner is,
of course, an open question. Certainly the equal rights amendment would
require the invalidation of all sex-based distinctions that result in dis-
crimination'7 8 and the uncertainty over the full thrust of Reed points
up the necessity of its adoption at the present time.
A different analysis is called for with respect to the constitution-
ality of segregation on the basis of sex. It has long been recognized that
it is a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
to discriminate against a person because of race, as by denying benefits
or requiring differentiated treatment.Y7 7 However, it was not until Brown
and its progeny that racial segregation was equated to discrimination and
held to be violative of equal protection.' It may be now asked whether
segregation on the basis of sex is "arbitrary" or whether it would abridge
177. See Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HAST.
L.J. 277, 282-86 (1971). The constitutionality of the pregnancy exclusion was upheld
in Clark v. California Empl. Stabilization Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 2d 326, 332 P.2d 716
(Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
178. See Brown, supra note 2, at 920-21.
179. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
180. The psychologist generally defines segregation as "a form of discrinination
that sets up spatial boundaries of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of members
of an out-group." G. ALLPoRT, THE NATURE oF PRnjuDicE 52 (Anchor ed. 1958). At
least after Brown the law recognized this elementary truth with respect to racial
segregation.
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"equality of rights under the law" within the meaning of the equal rights
amendment.
We are assuming, of course, that the state can require sexually
segregated rest rooms and the like in order to protect an individual's
right of privacy. But may it constitutionally maintain sexually segregated
schools or facilities open to the public? In Kirstein v. Rector &
Visitors,1 8' the court, finding that the University of Virginia was superior
to any of the other state-supported schools, held that women were being
discriminated against by being denied admission. However, the court
refused to consider whether the maintenance of sexually segregated in-
stitutions of higher education was itself unconstitutional.' In Williams
v. McNair,8 ' the court held that a male was not denied equal protection by
being refused admission to Winthrop, an all-female institution in South
Carolina, since there were other state-supported institutions of equal
quality that he could attend.' The effect of that decision is to uphold
the "separate but equal" doctrine in higher education as it applies to
sex: the state can limit attendance in certain schools to members of
one sex.'85 The court in Williams expressly upheld the maintenance of
sexually segregated schools on the ground that there was "a respectable
body of educators who believe that 'a single-sex institution can advance
the quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon
areas of primary interest to only one sex.' ""',
This reasoning demonstrates the correlation between sexually segre-
gated education and male supremacy. The curriculum of Winthrop
College is described as fitting young women "for teaching, . . . steno-
graphy, typewriting, telegraphy, bookkeeping, drawing, . . designing,
engraving, sewing, dressmaking, millinery, art, needlework, cooking,
housekeeping and such other industrial arts as may be suitable to their
sex and conducive to their support and usefullness."' 7 By establishing
separate schools for women the state is helping to channel them into
their societally perceived role of "wife and mother" and to insure that
they will continue to be societally subordinate to men. It can be argued
181. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
182. Id. at 187. It held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the issue and
that, in any event, the record was insufficient. This point is discussed in Sedler,
Standing, Jiuticiability and All That, - VAND. L. RaV. - (1972).
183. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affd iner., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
184. The other institutions were integrated, except for the Citadel, a military
institution limited to males.
185. A different question might have been presented if all the institutions of
higher education had been segregated.
186. 316 F. Supp. at 137.
187. Id. at 136 n.3.
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that the state has no more interest in segregating and channeling people
on the basis of sex than it has in segregating them on the basis of race
and that it is no more a justifiable objective of the state to promote
male supremacy than it is to promote white supremacy.' This view
would require not only the admission of any person to a particular school
without regard to sex, but also, if the Brown rationale is to apply fully,
the dismantling of all sexually segregated educational institutions.'
As its per curiam affirmance of Williams indicates, the Supreme Court
is not yet ready to deal with sexual segregation in education.
In Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc.,9' it was held
that the state could not sanction sexual segregation in public facilities
such as alehouses. The court found that the regulation of alcoholic
beverage establishments in New York was so extensive that the action
of McSorleys' in refusing to serve women was "state action." With
respect to the discrimination itself, the court stated:
In the case before us no difference between men and women,
as potential customers of the defendant, has been offered as
a rational basis for serving the one and not the other. It may
be argued that the occasional preference of men for a haven
to which they may retreat from the watchful eyes of wives
or womanhood in general to have a drink or pass a few hours
in their own company, is justification enough; that the simple
fact that women are not men justifies defendant's practice.
The answer is that McSorleys' is a public place, not a private
club, and that the preferences of certain of its patrons are no
justification under the Equal Protection Clause. Such pre-
ferences, no matter how widely shared by defendant's male
clientele, bear no rational relation to the suitability of women
as customers of 'McSorleys'.
Nor do we find any merit in the argument that the pre-
sence of women in bars gives rise to 'moral and social problems'
against which McSorleys' can reasonably protect itself by ex-
cluding women from the premises. . . . Outdated images of
bars as dens of coarseness and iniquity and of women as
peculiarly delicate and impressionable creatures in need of
protection from the rough and tumble of unvarnished humanity
188. An analysis of the decision and a comparison with racial segregation appears
in Johnston, supra note 18, at 723-36.
189. Cf. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of choice"
in racially segregated schools).
190. 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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will no longer justify sexual separatism .... 191
It should be noted that discrimination on the basis of sex with respect
to public accommodations is not prohibited by title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964192 or by most state antidiscrimination laws. 9 ' However, it
can be argued that the failure to prohibit such discrimination, at least
on the state level, is unconstitutional as an "encouragement to private
discrimination."'9 " In any event, the denial of access to public facilities
on the basis of sex is a further reminder of the societal subordination
of women and is inconsistent with the principle of sexual equality.
Still another question to be considered is whether past discrimination
against women can be taken into account so that, in effect, women are
given preference over men. In Gruenwald v. Gardner,9 ' the court upheld
the constitutionality of the provisions of the Social Security Act allow-
ing women to retire at age 62 with full benefits while denying men
that privilege until they reached age 65.' The court found that the
purpose of the distinction was "to reduce the disparity between the
economic and physical capabilities of a man and a woman," '197 noting
that women as a class earn considerably less than men as a class and
that the average monthly payments to men retiring at age 62 still
exceeded those of women retiring at that age. However, title VII has
been interpreted as invalidating retirement plans which allow women
to retire at an earlier age or with more favorable benefits than men. 9
It is permissible, of course, to consider past racial discrimination in
fashioning affirmative action that will eliminate the present effects of
that discrimination.' 99 And it is likely that the sex-based distinction
involved in Gruenwald would not be considered arbitrary under the
Reed rationale, since it is responsive to past discrimination based on
sex. The issue here is similar to that presented with respect to com-
191. Id. at 605-06.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970).
193. See generally Seidenberg, The Federal Bar v. The Ale House Bar: Women
and Pubik Accommodations, 5 VALPARAISo L. REv. 318 (1971).
194. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In Taylor v. Richardson, No.
2270 (E.D. Ky., Feb. 22, 1972), the court held that the exemption of barbers beauticians
from the state's public accommodations law constituted such "encouragement."
195. 390 F.2d 591 2d Cir. 1968).
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 415(b) (2) (A), (3) (A), (3) (C) (1970).
197. 390 F.2d at 592.
198. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied
404 U.S 939 (1971); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454
(D.N.J. 1970).
199. As illustrative of the affirmative action that can be ordered to alleviate
the present effects of past racial discrimination in employment, see Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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pensatory programs designed to eliminate the cumulative effect of racial
discrimination, and it is equally troublesome. I would only note that it
may not necessarily be discriminatory to give certain preferences to
women to eliminate the effects of past discrimination which have been
practiced upon them.
With or without the equal rights amendment, sex-based distinc-
tions in law and discrimination and segregation on the basis of sex must
be eliminated. In the eyes of the law, male people must no longer be
considered "more equal than female people." When the law itself stops
distinguishing between people on the basis of their sex, it may be
hoped that the other institutions of society will follow suit.
CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset of this article, liberation means freedom.
If women are to have the freedom to choose their life role and to
maximize their "life chances," the law must do a complete turnabout. It
must make sexual equality an officially approved societal value and
must remove from within itself those sexual biases and distinctions
which continue to reinforce and perpetuate the societally subordinate
role of women. At the same time it must be used affirmatively as an
instrument of social change to end the discrimination and inequality
that now exist throughout American society.
In the final analysis it is not really possible to talk about women's
liberation any more than it is possible to talk about black liberation. If
the liberation of blacks will be the liberation of whites, so too will the
liberation of women be the liberation of men. As Leo Kanowitz has
pointed out so well:
By relegating women to special tasks, by perpetuating ancient
myths about the alleged physical and psychological limitations
of women, we American men have subjected ourselves to
an awesome burden. For the doubtful joys of feeling superior
to women, we have paid a terrible price. Not only have we
suffered with respect to uneven laws in the field of support
obligations within the family, child support and custody awards
in divorce proceedings, and the frequent lack of protective
labor legislation where such legislation exists for women,
but our insistence that men and only men are entitled to be
society's doers and shakers had led to our dying from eight
to ten years earlier, on the average, than the women of our
country. Perhaps even more important it that, because of
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arbitrary social and legal distinctions, both men and women
are often prevented from relating to one another as people,
as fellow members of the human race.2"'
Women's liberation means human liberation and the freedom of men
and women to relate to each other as human beings rather than as
sexual stereotypes. And perhaps, when this is so, "The emergent truth
about men and women may be rather richer than we dare to hope." ''
200. 116 CONG. REc. 31,533 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1970) (remarks of Prof. Leo
Kanowitz).
201. Cavanaugh, supra note 10, at 287.
